“Vice Admiral Turner declared the island [Saipan] secured, putting the time at 1615 of 9 July [1944]. The next day an official flag-raising took place at [Marine General] Holland Smith’s headquarters in Charan Kanoa. For the Marines at Marpi Point, a tragic sight took the edge off a happy occasion. Hundreds of Japanese civilians, fearful of the Americans, committed suicide by jumping from the seaside cliffs. Some took their children with them. Efforts to stop them fell upon ears deafened by Japanese propaganda.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “Northern Saipan: End of the Campaign”
Category: The Second World War
“Just before sunrise, about 0400 on 7 July [1944], like some ancient barbaric horde, the Japanese soldiers started down the Tanapag plain from around Makunsha. The attack route followed mainly along the coastal railroad. The men were led by officers, and they were equipped with machine guns, mortars, and tanks. Yet it was like military order gone awry, replaced by individual passion, a fearful charge of flesh and fire. Savage and primitive, the assault reverted to warfare of centuries before. Some of the enemy were armed only with rocks or a knife mounted on a pole. Whatever it was that drove the Japanese, or inspired them, they came on and on, straight into the muzzles of opposing guns. ‘They just kept coming and coming,’ recalled Major Edward McCarthy, commanding 2/105. ‘I didn’t think they’d ever stop. It was like a cattle stampede.’ The exact number of the attackers will probably never be known, but it was believed to approximate 3,000, including remnants of every unit on the island, even walking wounded.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “Northern Saipan: End of the Campaign”
“At 0730 on 1 July [1944], the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, in a well executed tank-infantry thrust, overran Tommy’s Pimple with no casualties. The battalion then advanced, in conjunction with 2/8, toward the Tanapag Harbor area. To the regimental left, on 1 July, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, was joined by 2/2, relieving 3/8, and the two battalions reported good progress. The day’s action included seizure of the last two Pimples, Larry’s and Stan’s.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “Northern Saipan: End of the Campaign”
“Success at last crowned the efforts of the 27th Infantry Division, for on 29 and 30 June [1944] the soldiers burst through Death Valley and drew alongside the 8th Marines. The 106th Infantry joined the 105th in overrunning the valley, a company from 1/106 wiped out the stragglers trapped in Hell’s Pocket, and 2/165 eliminated the die-hards entrenched on Purple Heart Ridge.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “The Fight for Central Saipan”
“Colonel Wallace’s 8th Marines, with 2/25 again withdrawn to corps control, found itself up against a formidable barrier, four small hills, one lying within the zone of each battalion. Because of their size in comparison to [Mount] Tapotchau, the hills were dubbed the Four Pimples. To make identification easier, each of them was given the nickname of the commander of the battalion that was to capture it. Thus, Major William C. Chamberlain of 2/8 was responsible for Bill’s Pimple, Lieutenant Colonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins of 1/29 for Tommy’s Pimple, Major Stanley E. Larsen of 3/8 for Stan’s Pimple, and Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr., of 1/8 for Larry’s Pimple.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “The Fight for Central Saipan”
“After six crowded days aboard an LST [Landing Ship, Tank], many Marines were ready to fight anybody.” – Major Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, Saipan: The Beginning of the End
“When such a small island as Engebi is hit by about 130 bombs a day, and, having lost its ammunition and provisions, lies helpless, it is no wonder that some soldiers have gone out of their minds.” – Excerpt from the diary of an unidentified member of the Japanese 1st Amphibious Brigade, in Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, in Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “Part III, The Marshalls: Quickening the Pace”
“Effective combat units are achieved by effective unit training, and can never be replaced by assorted combinations of component units, however highly trained.” – Col. Joseph C. Anderson (quoted by Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, in Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “Part III, The Marshalls: Quickening the Pace”)
“At this time [early morning, January 31, 1944], the reconnaissance company lost radio contact with the task force. Unaware that the enemy had abandoned Darrit, Admiral Hill ordered the USS Portland to shell the island at 0634. Within 20 minutes, contact was regained, the bombardment was stopped, and a scheduled air strike was cancelled. The troops then occupied Darrit, raising the American flag for the first time over prewar Japanese territory at 0955.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “Part III, The Marshalls: Quickening the Pace”
“The executive officer of the 106th Infantry [Regiment] recalled that, during a briefing of principal commanders and staff officers at Pearl Harbor in January [1944], Admiral Turner said, in effect: ‘I say to you commanders of ships—your mission is to put the troops ashore and support their attack to the limit of your capabilities. We expect to lose some ships! If your mission demands it, risk your ship!’” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, “Part III, The Marshalls: Quickening the Pace” (emphasis in original)
“Colonel Hall, his regimental headquarters group, and the men of 1/8 had spent the night at the line of departure, waiting in vain for orders to land on Betio. Although division had issued such an order, on the afternoon of D-Day, the message had not reached the regimental commander. Finally, at 0200 on the morning of 21 November [1943], Hall was contacted and told to report the position of 1/8 and the condition of its men. He replied that his Marines, in boats near the control vessel, were ‘resting easy,’ a surprisingly cheerful description of men that had spent over 12 hours in bobbing landing craft.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Volume III, Part II, “The Gilberts Operation”
“Nothing stokes human creativity like the desire to kill a motherfucker you don’t like.” – The Fat Electrician, “America’s Secret Weapon That Won WW2 – VT Fuze”
“By the end of November 1943, the new Allied Control Commission working with the [new] Italian Government was at the end of its rope. The 1943 harvest had fallen 25 to 30 percent below normal; amassing grain under the old unpopular Fascist system completely broke down and the major portion of the short harvest found its way into the black market. Even the low 150-gram bread ration [a little more than a quarter-pound per person daily] could not be maintained, and the only way to prevent mass starvation in urban centers such as Naples seemed to be a crash program of imports.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The Army and Civilian Supply – I,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“The minor wars in Ethiopia, Spain, and Albania had placed a severe strain on the Italian economy; three years of World War II as a German ally pushed it to the brink of collapse. Italy entered the war in 1940 unprepared and was never able to mobilize her economy in efficient fashion. Though nominally an ally, Italy was forced into an economic as well as political and military dependence on Germany that left her at the mercy of the Nazi overlords of Europe. The country did not prosper under the German hegemony.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The Army and Civilian Supply – I,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“The invasion of Sicily was the first Allied operation for which there was a definite civilian supply plan prepared in advance. The plan, to cover a 90-day military period, was based on the assumption that once the dust of battle settled, Sicily would be self-sufficient except for coal and oil. For such immediate relief needs as arose, AFHQ [Allied Force Headquarters] hoped to rely mainly on stockpiles in North Africa. Only 12,100 tons of food were requested from the United States, and some thought even that quantity excessive. The Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) instituted in Sicily soon found this optimism entirely unwarranted. Whether there was enough grain to provide bread for all the people was a debatable proposition, but, for the moment quantity was irrelevant, since the lack of transport, the colossal black market, farm hoarding, and the ravages of battle kept grain out of the cities. Two months after the invasion, cities such as Palermo were still living ‘hand to mouth’ with ‘not even 24 hours reserves of breadstuffs in the town.’” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The Army and Civilian Supply – I,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“The War Department, while insisting adamantly on military control over civilian supply during the initial phases of operations in overseas theaters, also sought vigorously to limit that responsibility to the narrow field of relief. This attitude in the end produced serious delays in the provision of rehabilitation supplies necessary for the resuscitation of transportation and communication facilities, and industrial and agricultural production in liberated areas. Slow progress in rehabilitation almost inevitably resulted in larger and larger demands for relief. The experience in every liberated territory pointed to the need for a balanced economic program with internal transport as perhaps the real heart of the problem. The military formula of food, fuel, and sanitary and medical supplies was therefore hardly a satisfactory one.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The Army and Civilian Supply – I,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“At the outset of the North African campaign, on 13 November 1942, President Roosevelt declared: ‘No one will go hungry, or without the means of livelihood in any territory occupied by the United Nations, if it is humanly possible within our power to make supplies available to them.’ This announcement heralded the beginning of a civilian supply problem that was to complicate the work of military logisticians immensely. It was not just a matter of humanitarian concern as the President’s announcement might suggest, but one of military necessity. Disease and disorder in rear areas or lack of co-operation from local governments could easily disrupt lines of communications and endanger the success of military operations.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The Army and Civilian Supply – I,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“During the first two years after the German attack in 1941 the urgency of Soviet needs had been so great, the threat of Soviet collapse so imminent and foreboding for the Allied cause, that almost any effort or sacrifice seemed justified in order to deliver supplies. This sense of urgency died hard even under the changed conditions of the last half of the war when victory over Germany and Japan seemed assured. The postwar implications of thus helping to strengthen the Soviet position in Europe and Asia were either not foreseen or ignored.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “Aid to the USSR in the Later War Years,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“In the postwar period the United States was to be forced to resort to new devices to maintain a going British economy and to bolster British military strength, starting with a loan in 1946 and progressing through the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security Program. A forthright approach to the problem in 1945 might have saved much lost time and have been more economical in the end. Certainly the restrictive attitude of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] played some part in preventing such a forthright approach to a situation in which Presidential direction was uncertain and a practical policy vacuum existed. It seems evident that both Roosevelt and Truman, the latter perhaps belatedly after Potsdam, saw the need for helping the British in their postwar economic adjustment, but Roosevelt’s hand was faltering in the last six months of his life and he did not take the necessary steps either to lay down a clear policy for the executive branch to follow or to secure the legislative authority that would have made the course of his successor easier. Without legislative authority, Truman felt his hands were tied, and lend-lease was allowed to lapse without any real consideration of how it might be used as an effective instrument of U.S. policy in promoting postwar adjustments—just as it had been used during hostilities as an extremely effective means for fighting a coalition war.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The End of the Common Pool,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“The British did not have quite the same respect for the ‘scientific’ calculation of requirements that the Americans at least professed to have, and regarded the end result as merely an educated guess. It is at least possible that American insistence that the British determine their requirements far in advance was also conditioned less by their confidence in anybody’s ability to do so than by their desire to keep production plans stable and not allow them to be continually disrupted by British demands for bits and pieces.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “Lend-Lease and the Common Pool,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“The framework of plans for the final massive assault against Japan had been started in 1943 and 1944; the military machine for executing them was in existence and needed only to be moved into position. Schooled in the necessity of preparing for every contingency, fearful that public pressures might lead to the premature dismantling of the military machine, and, for the most part, unaware of the new technological revolution brewing in the laboratories and on the testing grounds, American military staffs continued to work at completing the structure around the framework of plans until the very moment that the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima presented startling evidence of the arrival of a new age in warfare.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “Logistics of a One-Front War,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“The argument can certainly be made that the Japanese would hardly have surrendered except in the certain knowledge that the United States had the means, the plans, and the intent to invade, whatever the effects of bombing (atomic and conventional), blockade, and Soviet entry into the war. Legitimate criticism can still be directed at the massive scale on which the final effort against Japan was planned when forces of the Army and Navy and of America’s allies are taken into consideration, at the seeming absorption of the military staffs in preparing for the execution of plans that had generated a momentum of their own, and at their failure to take into consideration in their plans the possibility of Japan’s collapse, or to even begin a downward adjustment of force requirements until that collapse was a certainty.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “Logistics of a One-Front War,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“On 6 August 1945 an American B-29 dropped one atomic bomb on Hiroshima. On 8 August the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and its Far Eastern armies began their march into Manchuria. On 9 August another atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki. On 15 August a Japanese Government that had long before concluded that the war was lost made known its intention to surrender. On 2 September the surrender was consummated in ceremonies aboard the U.S.S. Missouri. The war against Japan thus came to its end in a manner radically different from that which the military planning staffs had envisaged. The elaborate plans and preparations for invasion of Japan had no ultimate utility.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “Logistics of a One-Front War,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“On many Pacific islands supplies were to deteriorate in open storage until 1950 when the United States was to find a new and unexpected use for them in the Korean War. A naval historian, commenting on the roll-up of naval supplies in the South Pacific, has summed up the effort of the Army just as fittingly: ‘The logic of rolling forward rear bases was impeccable. In the case of personnel its urgency could not be denied. But to set up a cross current against the normal flow of supply and support proved to be extremely difficult, if not impracticable. Much of the usable material was in fact moved forward. The rest remained in the South Pacific to be locally disposed of or to stand as a monument to the unsparing waste of war and the greater importance of time over cost.’ The ‘greater importance of time over cost’ might indeed be designated as the most important factor in logistics in World War II.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “Logistics of a One-Front War,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“We are dealing with distances half way around the world. We are dealing in personnel by the million. We are dealing with supply in millions of tons. A mass of detail and delicate timing is involved.” – General Brehon B. Somervell, USA, Commanding General, Army Service Forces, May 15, 1945 (as quoted by Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “Logistics of a One-Front War,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945)
“That final victory over Japan was assured, there was no longer any doubt in U.S. councils. Timing was the vital question. American staffs, reflecting the temper of American public opinion, were impatient. Their impatience, nevertheless, did not permit them to underestimate Japanese ability to resist. To the Army staff, at least, mass invasion seemed the quickest way, indeed the only way, in which Japanese capitulation could be assured. It was also undoubtedly the costliest way both in human lives and resources.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The Pacific in Transition,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“Whatever the shortages of equipment that may have remained in the Pacific by the fall of 1944, none was so serious as the shortage of troop labor to perform the thousand and one tasks involved in the operation of a supply line in territory where facilities were primitive and native labor either nonexistent or totally unskilled. The shortage of service troops in the Pacific was a chronic condition—one that began with the arrival of the first American troops and endured until the end of the war. It was a contributing factor to practically every other problem of Pacific logistics. The shortage of port battalions contributed to every instance of ship congestion, the shortage of Quartermaster troops to every instance of spoiled rations, that of Engineer construction battalions to every instance of failure to build airfields, roads, and other facilities on time. The inadequate supply of service troops imposed far more severe limitations on the pace of the Pacific advance than did the supply of combat units. As General Somervell wrote from the South Pacific in September 1943, it was not ‘a case of “frills”—but one of getting beans, shoes and bullets to the men who are fighting and to save those fighting from being laid out with pestilence,’ of building facilities at primitive bases which the Japanese did not have the resources or ability to match. ‘It would be a great mistake,’ he said, not to supply service troops ‘in full measure and make the most of this advantage.’” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The War Against Japan, 1943-44,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“The first Engineer units sent out were too lightly equipped; they did not have either adequate quantities of equipment or heavy enough equipment for clearing jungles and building in jungle terrain. The initial conception, in fact, was apparently that much of the construction work in the Pacific would be pick and shovel work. It soon became clear that one of the principal points of American superiority over the enemy lay in heavy construction equipment—bulldozers, cranes, rollers, graders, crushers, drilling equipment, power shovels, power saw mills, and so forth—that could do the work of many men.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The War Against Japan, 1943-44,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“Multiple handling and transshipment at several points took their toll in breakage, deterioration, and pilferage. Storage north of Australia or New Caledonia was usually inadequate, and deterioration in open storage in a tropical climate appallingly swift. Rations spoiled, canvas rotted, ammunition became unusable, and machinery rusted. ‘There has been considerable wastage in all types of supplies . . . ,’ wrote Somervell from the South Pacific in September 1943. ‘This loss has been particularly high in ammunition and rations. No one really knows how much food has been spoiled. It is certain, however, that as much as 50 percent of some types of ammunition has gone to waste and hundreds of thousands if not millions of rations have been lost.’ In June 1943 an observer thought at least 40 percent of the rations in SWPA [Southwest Pacific Area] spoiled or unconsumable.” – Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, “The War Against Japan, 1943-44,” Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
“The bombers, both of the attacking and the diversionary force, came through with no losses and with a minimum of damage. Enemy opposition had been slight. Antiaircraft fire was observed at two places, but only two planes sustained damage, and that slight. Fighter opposition was negligible. Three Me-109’s attacked the formation, and several others put in a silent appearance. Of those attacking, one was claimed as damaged by fire from the B-17’s. The bomber crews received no injury at all from enemy action, the only casualties having occurred when, on the way home, one plane hit a pigeon and the shattered glass from the nose of the bomber slightly injured the bombardier and navigator.” – Arthur B. Ferguson, “Rouen-Sotteville No. 1, 17 August 1942” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)