“The bombers, both of the attacking and the diversionary force, came through with no losses and with a minimum of damage. Enemy opposition had been slight. Antiaircraft fire was observed at two places, but only two planes sustained damage, and that slight. Fighter opposition was negligible. Three Me-109’s attacked the formation, and several others put in a silent appearance. Of those attacking, one was claimed as damaged by fire from the B-17’s. The bomber crews received no injury at all from enemy action, the only casualties having occurred when, on the way home, one plane hit a pigeon and the shattered glass from the nose of the bomber slightly injured the bombardier and navigator.” – Arthur B. Ferguson, “Rouen-Sotteville No. 1, 17 August 1942” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)
Category: The Second World War
“The advisability of getting its crews into the United Kingdom outweighed the desirability of more thorough training before departure. But this meant that crews arrived with little or no experience in high-altitude flying. Pilots and co-pilots had received little instruction in flying formations at any altitude, to say nothing of maintaining tight formations at the extreme altitudes planned for day bomber missions. Many of the radio operators could neither send nor receive the Morse code. Worse yet, the gunners proved to be almost completely unfamiliar with their equipment. Many of them had had little or no opportunity to shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency was especially disturbing to the Eighth Air Force experts because they felt sure that the ability of the heavy bombers to destroy enemy targets by daylight without prohibitive loss would depend in large part on their ability to defend themselves against enemy fighters.” – Arthur B. Ferguson, “Rouen-Sotteville No. 1, 17 August 1942” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)
“Combat crews [on Umnak Island, Alaska] set up their own tents and until 5 June [1942] cooked their own meals. Their bivouac area was a sea of mud; water covered the ground inside many of their tents and all crews were on alert from dawn to dark, which at that time of the year extended from 0400 to 2300. They went with little or no sleep for 48-hour periods, and they performed much of their own maintenance, pumping the gas from barrels and pouring oil from five-gallon cans.” – Kramer J. Rohfleisch, “Drawing the Battle Line in the Pacific” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)
“Military necessity gave the greatest strategic importance to that section of the country [Australia] which had been least developed; the main centers of population, wealth, and transportation were in the southeast, whereas the north and northeast now held the position of key military importance. The difficulty of transporting goods overland from Brisbane to Darwin was as great as from Darwin to the Philippines, if not so dangerous. No railroad connected the two cities, which were 2,500 miles apart by the most expeditious land route. For over a quarter of this distance only a rough motor road cut through the central desert, and this road ended approximately 300 miles from Darwin to connect with a railway capable of carrying no more than 300 tons of freight per day. Repair facilities were inadequate for maintenance of either road or railway, and some of the rolling stock literally buckled under the weight of heavy American equipment.” – Richard L. Watson, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)
“[O]ne spectacular new air weapon, a drone bomb, was tested against Japanese targets . . . . The drones, specially built planes capable of carrying a 2,000-pound bomb, were radio controlled by torpedo bombers of a special naval test unit. Synchronized television screens in drone and control planes enabled the controllers to view what was ahead of the drones and to crash them against point targets. After test attacks . . . . [t]he results were inconclusive. . . . [T]here was a future for this weapon, but . . . it needed more development work and better aircraft.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part VI, Conclusion”
“The days passed in a blur. Every day we sent the Zeros up on frantic interception flights. The young and inexperienced student pilots had become battle-hardened veterans, their faces showing the sudden realization of death all about them. Not for a moment did the Americans ease their relentless pressure. Day and night the bombers came to pound Rabaul, to smash at the airfield and shipping in the harbor, while the fighters screamed low in daring strafing passes, shooting up anything they considered a worthwhile target.” – Commander Masatake Okumiya (quoted in Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”)
“One of the major points which has too often been overlooked in an evaluation of fighting power, but which determined to a large extent the efficiency of air units, was that of hygienic installations. Japanese engineers paid scant attention to this problem, dismissing the pressing matter of mosquito protection by simply rigging mosquito nets in personnel quarters. Sanitary facilities were basically crude and ineffective; certainly they contributed nothing to the morale of ground and air crews. The Americans, by contrast, swept clean vast areas surrounding their ground installations with advanced mechanical aids. Through exhaustive disinfecting operations, they banished flies and mosquitos from their airbases and paid similar attention to every phase of sanitation and disease. Some may consider this a prosaic matter, but it was vital to the men forced to live on desert islands and in the midst of jungles swarming with disease and insect life. The inevitable outcome of such neglect was a tremendous difference in the health of the American and Japanese personnel who were assigned to these forward air facilities.” – Commander Terufumi Kofukuda (quoted in Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”)
“Fighter pilot or bomber crewman, the Japanese naval flyer who fought at Rabaul was aware that he was waging a losing battle. The plane he flew was a torch, waiting only an incendiary bullet to set it alight. The gaping holes in his unit left by the death of veterans were filled by young, inexperienced replacements, more a liability than an asset in combat air operations. Despite the handicaps under which he fought—out-numbered, out-gunned, and out-flown—the enemy flyers fought, tenaciously right up to the day when Rabaul was abandoned to its ground defenders.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”
“The [Japanese] pilots who began the war averaged 800 hours of flying time, and many of them had combat experience in China. Relatively few of these men survived until the end of 1943; a great many died at Coral Sea and Midway and in air battles over Guadalcanal.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”
“There was no [Japanese] plane that flew from Rabaul that was not a potential flaming death trap to its crew. To meet the specifications outlined by the Japanese Navy, aircraft designers sacrificed safety to achieve maneuverability in fighters and long range in bombers.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”
“Much of the plane [Mitsubishi ‘Betty’] was built of lightweight magnesium, a very inflammable metal, and in the wing roots and body between were poorly protected fuel and oil tanks. The result was a highly vulnerable aircraft so prone to burst into flames when hit that Japanese aircrews nicknamed it ‘Type 1 Lighter.’” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”
“The one irredeemable error of a supply program is not too much, but too little.” – “Report of War Department Procurement Review Board” (quoted in Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945)
“One of the items asked for by [Colonel] Puller in an urgent dispatch, several hundred bottles of mosquito lotion, raised a few eyebrows at division headquarters, but the request was filled promptly. The Gilnit Group commander’s well-known disdain for the luxuries of campaigning caused the wonder, but the explanation was simple and a lesson in jungle existence. As a patrol member later remarked: ‘Hell, the colonel knew what he was about. We were always soaked and everything we owned was likewise, and that lotion made the best damn stuff to start a fire with that you ever saw.’” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part IV, The New Britain Campaign”
“The climate of western New Britain is what might be expected of a region of jungle-covered mountains and swamps. At all times during the year, the humidity is high, and the daytime temperature range hovers around 90 degrees; at night the temperature seldom drops below 72 degrees. The annual rainfall usually totals 150–200 inches and much of this, an average of 30 inches a month, comes during the period of the northwest monsoon, mid-December to mid-February. In this wettest season, rain may fall almost every day and squalls with torrential downpours are frequent. The northwest winds are strong and fairly steady, making the sea rough and the surf heavy. The dry season at Cape Gloucester occurs during the summer months when the prevailing southeast winds vent most of their force on the south slopes of the mountains. The periods between the two seasons, and the period of the southeast monsoon itself, are times of comparatively calm weather. The campaign to seize control of western New Britain would be fought in the worst possible weather of the year. Low-lying terrain would disappear beneath a cover of standing water, and, on the higher ground, the trees, the undergrowth, and the land itself would become and remain, rainsoaked. The prospect was that attacker and defender alike, mired in combat in the dripping jungle, would curse the day they set foot on the island.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul , History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol.II, “Part IV, The New Britain Campaign”
“ABDA Command was conceived as a means for the Allies to defend Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. As U.S. and British leaders convened in Washington in late December 1941 and grappled with the unexpected collapsing situation in the Far East, they pushed for a unified command structure. In a surprise to the British, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George C. Marshall, supported even more surprisingly by Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, pushed to have a British army general put in charge of ABDA, while British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pushed to have an American admiral put in charge. Both sides apparently saw the situation as lost, leading to the gracious offers to have the other put in charge.” – Samuel J. Cox, The Java Sea Campaign
“Actual authorship of a military document is seldom known.” – James Lee Cate, E. Kathleen Williams, & Louis E. Asher Fellow, “The Air Corps Prepares for War, 1939-41,” The Army Air Forces in World War II
“Fagan’s battalion, with Company M of the 3d Raider Battalion and a forward observer team from the l2th Marines attached, embarked on board LCMs and LCVPs at cape Torokina early on the morning of 29 November [1943]. One hour later, at 0400, the boats moved in toward the Koiari beach and the Marines were landed virtually in the middle of a Japanese supply dump. The surprise was mutual. A Japanese officer, armed only with a sword, and apparently expecting Japanese boats, greeted the first Marines ashore. His demise and the realization of his mistake were almost simultaneous. The Marines, now committed to establishing a beachhead in the midst of an enemy camp, dug in as quickly as possible to develop the situation.” – Maj. Douglas T. Kane, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “Northern Solomons Operations: End of a Mission,” Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II
“In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian bombers gained experience in the use of various types of projectiles, and experiments were conducted in dropping ammunition, food, and water to the Italian ground forces; even fresh meat was supplied for the troops by the dropping of live goats and sheep which parachuted to the desert and took up the march with the army until they were needed for food.” – E. Kathleen Williams & Louis E. Asher Fellow, “Air War, 1939-41,” The Army Air Forces in World War II
“New Georgia lacked the drama of the early months of Guadalcanal and the awesome scope of later battles in the Central Pacific. Instead, it was characterized by a considerable amount of fumbling, inconclusive combat; and the final triumph was marred by the fact that a number of command changes were required to insure the victory. There were few tactical or strategic successes and the personal hardships of a rigorous jungle campaign were only underscored by the planning failures.” – Maj. Douglas T. Kane, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “End of a Campaign,” Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II
“Breakfast on the morning of the 10th was not a problem for the raiders who had not eaten since the morning of the 9th. There was no food.” – Maj. Douglas T. Kane, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “The Dragons Peninsula Campaign: Capture of Enogai,” Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II
“Modern war with its extravagant material factors places an especial importance upon a nation’s economic structure and particularly upon its ‘industrial web.’ A nation may be defeated simply by the interruption of the delicate balance of this complex organization, which is vulnerable to the air arm and directly to neither of the other arms. It is possible that a moral collapse brought about by disturbances in this close-knit web may be sufficient to force an enemy to surrender.” – James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, “The Army Air Arm Between Two Wars, 1919-39,” The Army Air Forces in World War II
“Of the roughly 21,000 Japanese defenders, 216 survived the battle to be taken prisoner, and an estimated 3,000 went into hiding during the U.S. occupation of the island. By August 1945, most of these had either been killed, captured, or had surrendered, but one group did not lay down its arms until 1949.” – Carsten Fries, “Battle of Iwo Jima”
“Many men with malaria were hospitalized more than once . . . many suffered from a milder form of malaria or other illness and did not turn in at the hospital at all. It became a rule of thumb in front-line units that unless one had a temperature of more than 103 degrees there would be no light duty or excuse from a patrol mission. The tropics weakened nearly everyone. Food had been in short supply during the early weeks of the [Guadalcanal] campaign, much of the fare had been substandard, and most of the long-time veterans of the fighting suffered some form of malnutrition.” – Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, Maj. Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “Final Period, 9 December 1942 to 9 February 1943,” Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. I
“All underground fuel storage areas on Sand Island [at Midway] were prepared for emergency destruction by demolition. The demolition system worked, too. On 22 May [1942] a sailor threw the wrong switch and blew up a good portion of the aviation gasoline.” – Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, Maj. Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “Midway Girds for Battle,” Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. I
“The [Pan-American] clipper took off for Midway at 12:50 that afternoon [December 8, 1941] to evacuate certain PAA personnel plus all passengers. Mr. H. P. Hevenor, a government official who missed the plane, was marooned on Wake and eventually ended up in Japanese hands. ‘It struck me as a rather drastic lesson in the wisdom of punctuality,’ commented Colonel Devereux [Officer-in-Charge, USMC 1st Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake Island].” – Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, Maj. Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “The Enemy Strikes,” Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. I
“The United States had no intention of defending America on its own soil as long as the situation permitted any other choice.” – Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, Maj. Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “The Marine Corps on the Eve of War,” Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. I
“At the outbreak of the war Iceland enjoyed the status of autonomous parliamentary monarchy, sharing the same king with Denmark. When the Nazis overran the latter nation in April 1940, the Icelandic Parliament voted to take over the executive power of the Danish King and to assume control of foreign affairs. The strategic island became, for all practical purposes, a completely independent republic—and a wholly defenseless one without even the pretense of an army or navy. This state of affairs gave rise to considerable concern in London and Washington, more genuine concern than it caused initially among the insular-minded Icelanders. To the British the threat appeared very desperate indeed. Early in May they determined to occupy Iceland, and the need for speed and secrecy fused decision and action. There was no time to stand on ceremony; despite Churchill’s bland assertion that the British occupation of Iceland was effected ‘with the concurrence of its people,’ they had, in fact, not been consulted beforehand. ‘As the attitude likely to be adopted by the Icelandic Government toward such an ‘invasion’ was in some doubt they were not informed of the proposed expedition.’ Indeed the first inkling the natives had that anything out of the ordinary was afoot came when early-rising fishermen discovered a British destroyer nosing up to a jetty in the harbor of the island capital, Reykjavik. At 0620 on 10 May, a reinforced battalion of Royal Marines landed and occupied the town, moving so swiftly that it was able to seize the German Consulate before the hapless Consul could destroy his papers.” – Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, Maj. Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “Marine Occupation of Iceland,” Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. I
“It has been said whoever possesses Iceland holds a pistol firmly pointed at England, America, and Canada.” – Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance
“6/9/45—Eleventh Air Force—In coordination with Navy surface and air forces attacking in the Kurils, 6 B-24’s and 8 B-25’s fly extensive armed weather recon and anti-shipping sweeps over Kurabu and Otomari Capes, Ichinowatashi, and Asahigawa. The B-24’s score no results, half of them jettisoning their bombs. The B-25’s then fly a diversionary bombing mission over Araido where they are attacked by 8 Japanese fighters. To evade them, the B-25’s fly over Kamchatka where Soviet anti-aircraft fire shoots down one, killing its crew. Another damaged B-25 crash-lands in Petropavlovsk. This is the first time Soviet anti-aircraft hits a U.S. aircraft.” – Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller, U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II Combat Chronology, 1941 – 1945
“6/7/45—Twelfth Air Force—Major Gustav M. Minton, Jr., takes command of XXII Tactical Air Command, which ceases to function.” – Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller, U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II Combat Chronology, 1941 – 1945