“We have from the sixth century [AD] a much more elaborate classification of the civilian part of [Byzantine] society into ten groups, namely: 1. The clergy; 2. The judiciary; 3. Counsellors (senators?); 4. Those concerned with finance; 5. Professional and technical; 6. Commercial; 7. Those concerned with the provision of raw materials; 8. Subordinates and servants; 9. The useless (in other words, the old, the infirm and the insane); 10. Entertainers (charioteers, musicians, actors).” – Cyril Mango, Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome
Category: History
“The records of the central government (and it should be remembered that the Byzantine Empire was a bureaucratic state par excellence), of the provincial administration, of the Church, of secular landlords, tenants, merchants and shopkeepers have all disappeared. As a result, we have no reliable population figures, no registers of births, marriages and deaths, no trade figures, no taxation figures—practically nothing, in short, that can be counted and used for statistical purposes.” – Cyril Mango, Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome
“In a world full of wonders man invented boredom.” – Wendy Northcutt, The Darwin Awards: Next Evolution
“The bombers, both of the attacking and the diversionary force, came through with no losses and with a minimum of damage. Enemy opposition had been slight. Antiaircraft fire was observed at two places, but only two planes sustained damage, and that slight. Fighter opposition was negligible. Three Me-109’s attacked the formation, and several others put in a silent appearance. Of those attacking, one was claimed as damaged by fire from the B-17’s. The bomber crews received no injury at all from enemy action, the only casualties having occurred when, on the way home, one plane hit a pigeon and the shattered glass from the nose of the bomber slightly injured the bombardier and navigator.” – Arthur B. Ferguson, “Rouen-Sotteville No. 1, 17 August 1942” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)
“The advisability of getting its crews into the United Kingdom outweighed the desirability of more thorough training before departure. But this meant that crews arrived with little or no experience in high-altitude flying. Pilots and co-pilots had received little instruction in flying formations at any altitude, to say nothing of maintaining tight formations at the extreme altitudes planned for day bomber missions. Many of the radio operators could neither send nor receive the Morse code. Worse yet, the gunners proved to be almost completely unfamiliar with their equipment. Many of them had had little or no opportunity to shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency was especially disturbing to the Eighth Air Force experts because they felt sure that the ability of the heavy bombers to destroy enemy targets by daylight without prohibitive loss would depend in large part on their ability to defend themselves against enemy fighters.” – Arthur B. Ferguson, “Rouen-Sotteville No. 1, 17 August 1942” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)
“Let us sit upon the ground, and tell sad stories of the death of kings:—how some have been depos’d; some slain in war; some haunted by the ghosts they have depos’d; some poison’d by their wives; some sleeping kill’d; all murder’d:—for within the hollow crown that rounds the mortal temples of a king keeps Death his court.” – William Shakespeare, The Life and Death of King Richard II 3.2
“When Canens sang, cold rocks were moved to tears, or seemed less granite than a rock should be, the trees were swayed, rough beasts grew sentimental, and busy rivers winding miles away began to rest, to float, to fall asleep, and birds who heard her half-forgot to fly.” – Ovid: The Metamorphoses, trans. Horace Gregory
“Combat crews [on Umnak Island, Alaska] set up their own tents and until 5 June [1942] cooked their own meals. Their bivouac area was a sea of mud; water covered the ground inside many of their tents and all crews were on alert from dawn to dark, which at that time of the year extended from 0400 to 2300. They went with little or no sleep for 48-hour periods, and they performed much of their own maintenance, pumping the gas from barrels and pouring oil from five-gallon cans.” – Kramer J. Rohfleisch, “Drawing the Battle Line in the Pacific” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)
“Military necessity gave the greatest strategic importance to that section of the country [Australia] which had been least developed; the main centers of population, wealth, and transportation were in the southeast, whereas the north and northeast now held the position of key military importance. The difficulty of transporting goods overland from Brisbane to Darwin was as great as from Darwin to the Philippines, if not so dangerous. No railroad connected the two cities, which were 2,500 miles apart by the most expeditious land route. For over a quarter of this distance only a rough motor road cut through the central desert, and this road ended approximately 300 miles from Darwin to connect with a railway capable of carrying no more than 300 tons of freight per day. Repair facilities were inadequate for maintenance of either road or railway, and some of the rolling stock literally buckled under the weight of heavy American equipment.” – Richard L. Watson, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)
“[O]ne spectacular new air weapon, a drone bomb, was tested against Japanese targets . . . . The drones, specially built planes capable of carrying a 2,000-pound bomb, were radio controlled by torpedo bombers of a special naval test unit. Synchronized television screens in drone and control planes enabled the controllers to view what was ahead of the drones and to crash them against point targets. After test attacks . . . . [t]he results were inconclusive. . . . [T]here was a future for this weapon, but . . . it needed more development work and better aircraft.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part VI, Conclusion”
“The days passed in a blur. Every day we sent the Zeros up on frantic interception flights. The young and inexperienced student pilots had become battle-hardened veterans, their faces showing the sudden realization of death all about them. Not for a moment did the Americans ease their relentless pressure. Day and night the bombers came to pound Rabaul, to smash at the airfield and shipping in the harbor, while the fighters screamed low in daring strafing passes, shooting up anything they considered a worthwhile target.” – Commander Masatake Okumiya (quoted in Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”)
“One of the major points which has too often been overlooked in an evaluation of fighting power, but which determined to a large extent the efficiency of air units, was that of hygienic installations. Japanese engineers paid scant attention to this problem, dismissing the pressing matter of mosquito protection by simply rigging mosquito nets in personnel quarters. Sanitary facilities were basically crude and ineffective; certainly they contributed nothing to the morale of ground and air crews. The Americans, by contrast, swept clean vast areas surrounding their ground installations with advanced mechanical aids. Through exhaustive disinfecting operations, they banished flies and mosquitos from their airbases and paid similar attention to every phase of sanitation and disease. Some may consider this a prosaic matter, but it was vital to the men forced to live on desert islands and in the midst of jungles swarming with disease and insect life. The inevitable outcome of such neglect was a tremendous difference in the health of the American and Japanese personnel who were assigned to these forward air facilities.” – Commander Terufumi Kofukuda (quoted in Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”)
“Fighter pilot or bomber crewman, the Japanese naval flyer who fought at Rabaul was aware that he was waging a losing battle. The plane he flew was a torch, waiting only an incendiary bullet to set it alight. The gaping holes in his unit left by the death of veterans were filled by young, inexperienced replacements, more a liability than an asset in combat air operations. Despite the handicaps under which he fought—out-numbered, out-gunned, and out-flown—the enemy flyers fought, tenaciously right up to the day when Rabaul was abandoned to its ground defenders.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”
“The [Japanese] pilots who began the war averaged 800 hours of flying time, and many of them had combat experience in China. Relatively few of these men survived until the end of 1943; a great many died at Coral Sea and Midway and in air battles over Guadalcanal.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”
“There was no [Japanese] plane that flew from Rabaul that was not a potential flaming death trap to its crew. To meet the specifications outlined by the Japanese Navy, aircraft designers sacrificed safety to achieve maneuverability in fighters and long range in bombers.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”
“Much of the plane [Mitsubishi ‘Betty’] was built of lightweight magnesium, a very inflammable metal, and in the wing roots and body between were poorly protected fuel and oil tanks. The result was a highly vulnerable aircraft so prone to burst into flames when hit that Japanese aircrews nicknamed it ‘Type 1 Lighter.’” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part V, Marine Air Against Rabaul”
“It cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.” – Zbigniew Brzezenski (quoted by Tim Judah in “Ukraine on the Brink”)
“A marked tendency to overstate successes has been a consistent feature of Russian intelligence and military BDA [Battle Damage Assessments] and planning cycles during the period leading up to and then during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This is an almost unavoidable consequence of the way that the Russian political system works, where reporting what seniors wish to hear, reinforcing their previous decisions and inflating successes, is an absolute prerequisite for promotion to higher rank.” – Justin Bronk, et al., “The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defense”
“Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed.” – Abraham Lincoln, 1858
“The one irredeemable error of a supply program is not too much, but too little.” – “Report of War Department Procurement Review Board” (quoted in Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945)
“One of the items asked for by [Colonel] Puller in an urgent dispatch, several hundred bottles of mosquito lotion, raised a few eyebrows at division headquarters, but the request was filled promptly. The Gilnit Group commander’s well-known disdain for the luxuries of campaigning caused the wonder, but the explanation was simple and a lesson in jungle existence. As a patrol member later remarked: ‘Hell, the colonel knew what he was about. We were always soaked and everything we owned was likewise, and that lotion made the best damn stuff to start a fire with that you ever saw.’” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II, “Part IV, The New Britain Campaign”
“The climate of western New Britain is what might be expected of a region of jungle-covered mountains and swamps. At all times during the year, the humidity is high, and the daytime temperature range hovers around 90 degrees; at night the temperature seldom drops below 72 degrees. The annual rainfall usually totals 150–200 inches and much of this, an average of 30 inches a month, comes during the period of the northwest monsoon, mid-December to mid-February. In this wettest season, rain may fall almost every day and squalls with torrential downpours are frequent. The northwest winds are strong and fairly steady, making the sea rough and the surf heavy. The dry season at Cape Gloucester occurs during the summer months when the prevailing southeast winds vent most of their force on the south slopes of the mountains. The periods between the two seasons, and the period of the southeast monsoon itself, are times of comparatively calm weather. The campaign to seize control of western New Britain would be fought in the worst possible weather of the year. Low-lying terrain would disappear beneath a cover of standing water, and, on the higher ground, the trees, the undergrowth, and the land itself would become and remain, rainsoaked. The prospect was that attacker and defender alike, mired in combat in the dripping jungle, would curse the day they set foot on the island.” – Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul , History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol.II, “Part IV, The New Britain Campaign”
“ABDA Command was conceived as a means for the Allies to defend Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. As U.S. and British leaders convened in Washington in late December 1941 and grappled with the unexpected collapsing situation in the Far East, they pushed for a unified command structure. In a surprise to the British, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George C. Marshall, supported even more surprisingly by Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, pushed to have a British army general put in charge of ABDA, while British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pushed to have an American admiral put in charge. Both sides apparently saw the situation as lost, leading to the gracious offers to have the other put in charge.” – Samuel J. Cox, The Java Sea Campaign
“It is impossible to kill 7,000 to 8,000 people in the space of one week without methodical planning and substantial resources. Soldiers have to be mobilized to guard the prisoners, to move them from holding locations to execution sites, and to shoot them. Multiple locations to hold the prisoners and to execute them need to be identified and secured. Thousands of rounds of ammunition to shoot the prisoners need to be supplied. Numerous vehicles and hundreds of litres of fuel need to be commandeered to move the prisoners. A number of bulldozers and excavators need to be commissioned to dig their graves. During a state of war mobilizing such resources cannot be done at the whim of a few crazy soldiers. It needs to be ordered and authorized by commanders at high-levels.” – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Facts about Srebrenica”
“Those who act out of revenge, or call on it in order to justify crimes, are dealing a blow to the rule of law, and thus to civilization itself.” – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Facts about Srebrenica”
“In the first chapter of The Art of War it is written, ‘All warfare is based on deception.’ Deceiving one’s own country about warfare treats them like the enemy. After a while it becomes difficult to know who the enemy really is.” – Rayne, “Putin’s FSB: Failed Straightforwardness and Benevolence,” emptywheel, March 12, 2022
“Actual authorship of a military document is seldom known.” – James Lee Cate, E. Kathleen Williams, & Louis E. Asher Fellow, “The Air Corps Prepares for War, 1939-41,” The Army Air Forces in World War II
“Fagan’s battalion, with Company M of the 3d Raider Battalion and a forward observer team from the l2th Marines attached, embarked on board LCMs and LCVPs at cape Torokina early on the morning of 29 November [1943]. One hour later, at 0400, the boats moved in toward the Koiari beach and the Marines were landed virtually in the middle of a Japanese supply dump. The surprise was mutual. A Japanese officer, armed only with a sword, and apparently expecting Japanese boats, greeted the first Marines ashore. His demise and the realization of his mistake were almost simultaneous. The Marines, now committed to establishing a beachhead in the midst of an enemy camp, dug in as quickly as possible to develop the situation.” – Maj. Douglas T. Kane, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “Northern Solomons Operations: End of a Mission,” Isolation of Rabaul, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. II
“Every defect in a man, and in others’ way of taking him, our agreement that gold has value gives us power to rise above.” – Regina Corrado, “Unauthorized Cinnamon”, Deadwood
“In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian bombers gained experience in the use of various types of projectiles, and experiments were conducted in dropping ammunition, food, and water to the Italian ground forces; even fresh meat was supplied for the troops by the dropping of live goats and sheep which parachuted to the desert and took up the march with the army until they were needed for food.” – E. Kathleen Williams & Louis E. Asher Fellow, “Air War, 1939-41,” The Army Air Forces in World War II